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ABSTRACT
All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84
protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this
paper we discuss some of the main known problems, particularly those on operational security guarantee and
error correction. Most basic are the points that there is no security parameter in such protocols and it is
not the case the generated key is perfect with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ under the trace distance criterion d ≤ ǫ,
which is widely claimed in the technical and popular literature. The many serious security consequences of this
error about the QKD generated key would be explained, including practical ramification on achievable security
levels. It will be shown how the error correction problem alone may already defy rigorous quantitative analysis.
Various other problems would be touched upon. It is pointed out that rigorous security guarantee of much more
efficient quantum cryptosystems may be obtained by abandoning the disturbance-information tradeoff principle
and utilizing instead the known KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) principle in conjunction with a
new DBM (decoy bits method) principle that will be detailed elsewhere.
∗This paper with a similar title is to be published in the Proceedings of the SPIE Conference on Quantum-Physics-Based
Information Security held in Dresden, Germany, Sep 23-24, 2013. This v2 corrects some types in v1.
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1 INTRODUCTION
QKD (quantum key distribution) [1] protocols of the BB84 varieties involving disturbance information tradeoff
for security have been widely claimed and perceived to provide “perfect security” at reasonable key generation
rate. This is the case in numerous popular expositions and technical cryptography books which use exactly the
words “perfect security” [2], in major technical QKD review articles that claim perfect security except with a very
small probability [3], and in numerous technical papers on security theory and experimental implementations
with the words “unconditional security” [4]. This has been continuing despite the criticisms on the invalidity
of these claims, both fundamentally in theory and empirically in practice. See [5] for some references. It is
the purpose of this paper to present an accurate and readily understandable presentation of some fundamental
points in this connection, for proper appreciation of the scope and limit of QKD.
Cryptographic security occupies a very unusual status compared to most other issues in science and engineering.
It cannot be established experimentally in sufficient generality, if only because there are unlimited classes of
specific attacks, in addition to numerous other issues. One is justified in claiming security of a cryptographic
scheme only by proving it rigorously for a specific well defined mathematical model. Rigor is important, many
cryptosystems once thought secure turned out not, and many others such as AES appear to be secure already. If
only seed key is needed, plenty can be stored compactly in many applications. The issue of why a mathematical
model is applicable to a concrete QKD system gives rise to major problems not found in ordinary cryptography,
where the security mechanism is based on purely mathematical relations in contrast to QKD which involves
quantum effects of very small signals. Here we would just focus on the security claims about specific given
models. There are numerous invalid inferences in every major step of the offered security proofs, see [5] for brief
descriptions of some of them. Many will be mentioned but only a few will be discussed in the following.
In this paper we will concentrate on one most fundamental issue, the security criterion and its adequacy for
operational security guarantee. We will identify the serious ramifications of a major error of interpreting the
trace distance criterion still widely perpetuated today. Cryptographic security is a serious business and has to be
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validated by theory, which cannot be assured without scrutiny of the arguments offered for security proof. As a
concluding implication of our presentation, it will be indicated that given the apparently insurmountable security
proof problems facing BB84 type protocols, major modification of existing QKD protocols appears necessary in
which the disturbance-tradeoff principle is abandoned in lieu of other more powerful principles for valid security
proof. One such possibility will be indicated.
2 COMPARISON OF QKD WITH MATHEMATICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
In QKD two users Alice and Bob try to establish a new fresh key between them by a protocol that involves
five major steps outlined in section IV of [5]. For general security the protocol should be secure against an
adversary Eve who could launch any attack consistent with the laws of physics, active as wells as passive, both
during protocol execution and during actual use of the generated key K in a cryptographic application. Protocol
execution is interactive and requires message authentication between the users. Some sort of information-
disturbance tradeoff is utilized by the users which requires checking a portion of the quantum signals received
by Bob to try to make sure they have not been disturbed much in order that the information the attacker Eve
can extract from her attack on the other signals can be bounded below a tolerable threshold. In this paper we
can just take the quantum signals to be qubits modulated by the digital data bit sequence X chosen randomly
by Alice (except for CV-QKD in section 6).
QKD has always been compared to RSA or public key cryptography to this day, emphasizing its information
theoretic security (ITS) as compared to the complexity based security of RSA. I pointed out in [6] that QKD
should be compared to symmetric-key expansion which also offers ITS for the key security before it is used and
the ITS level of such symmetric-key ciphers is quite good compared to QKD systems. A prior shared secret
key is also needed in QKD as in symmetric-key expansion, at least for message authentication during protocol
execution needed to thwart man-in-the-middle attack. What is unsatisfactory about ordinary symmetric-key
expansion is that it has no ITS under known-plaintext attack (KPA) when the expanded key is used.
How does a known-plaintext attack work? Consider the case where K is broken into two segments K = K1||K2
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and used to OTP (one-time pad), or more accurately in an additive stream cipher to xor into the data X ′ =
X ′1||X
′
2 in an encryption application of K. We use sequence concatenation || here for simplicity instead of subset
disjoint union. In KPA let Eve know K ′1 exactly for simplicity. The cipher text K⊕X
′ is always open. Then Eve
knows K1 exactly and can use it to derive knowledge of K2 to help identify X
′
2 with the known K2⊕X
′
2. If K is
not uniformly distributed to Eve, there may be correlation between K1 and K2 that strongly compromises X
′
2.
The two significant points are that the precise quantitative ITS level of K is important and that for encryption
it is KPA security that the advantage of QKD consists in.
It is evident that there can be no KPA on X chosen by Alice. However, when K is used for OTP X ′, KPA
becomes possible for commercial applications at least. If KPA is not possible in some military applications so
that X ′ is uniform to Eve, K is totally protected and one can just use the ciphertext-only ITS from a running
key generated by standard pseudo-random number generators. Some indication on how much more secure that
is as compared to any realistic QKD key has been provided in [6], and a completed demonstration will be given
elsewhere.
3 MUTUAL INFORMATION, SECURITY CRITERION AND SECURITY
PARAMETER
The security criterion commonly employed in QKD for a long time, including in all the well known QKD
asymptotic security proofs and many experimental claims, is Eve’s mutual information onK that she could obtain
frommeasurement on her quantum probe together with the side information she collects during protocol execution
and during use of K in an application. In this quantum case it is often called her “accessible information,” the
maximum mutual information she could obtain by any quantum measurement. There is no need to consider
specific quantum feature here, we can take her quantum measurement to be an appropriately optimal one. Thus,
in obvious notation,
IE ≡ H(K)−H(K|E) (1)
Let n be the bit length of the generated key K, |K| = n, before accounting for any key cost during protocol
execution. They asymptotic security proofs assert that below a fixed nonzero threshold key rate r when the
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protocol is not aborted from qubit checking due to too much disturbance, one may obtain
IE → 0 as n→∞ (2)
With (2), n is taken to be a cryptographic security parameter which means security can be made arbitrarily
close to perfect by making the security parameter arbitrarily large. This is what the “perfect security” claim
was then based upon. More precisely, a protocol having unconditional security [4] means there is a security
parameter for arbitrary attacks consistent with the laws of physics, and in fact the key length in a QKD round
of key generation is taken to be such a security parameter.
It has been pointed out repeatedly since 2004 [7], through several talks including [8] and a full description in [9],
that it the rate that IE goes to zero that determines the security of K, not IE itself. This will be explained and
illustrated below. But first the proper description of Eve’s information of K from her attack should be given,
as follows [9].
From her probe measurement result yE together with side information, Eve derives a whole probability distri-
bution p(k|yE) obtained from p(yE |k) via Bayes rule, and p(yE |k) through ρ
k
E , her probe state [9]. We suppress
yE and write p(k|yE) as P = Pi on the possible values of K. Let N = 2
n, and order P1 ≥ ... ≥ PN . One should
compare P to U , the uniform distribution of N values. This is evidently the case if one looks at the quantitative
security problem as a detection theory problem for correctly identifying various subsets of K given whatever
information, such as that of KPA in identifying K2 (of the previous section) from knowing K1 = k1 (lower case
denotes specific value of the upper case random variable). M -ary detection is the appropriate framework for
security analysis, not Shannon information, for several reasons. Mutual information is a theoretical quantity,
one has to provide operational guarantee on Eve’s probabilities of success, and bit error rate (BER) when she
fails to identify a subsequence of K but nevertheless gets a lot more bits correctly compared to the perfect BER
1/2 from a uniform key, similar to the case of a non-uniform a priori distribution of K known to Eve. It is
clear the quality of K and its quantitative level must be compared to that of the uniform U , and there is no
reason to conclude a priori that any theoretical quantity is an adequate criterion when it is not zero (with zero
corresponding to perfect security). “Information” is just a technical term in this connection. One cannot read
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too much into the statement “Eve’s information is small.” How quantitatively small is small enough for what
purpose?
Thus, generally one needs the whole P Eve possesses to be able to assess various security details, which appears
to be an impossible task to estimate usefully in a QKD protocol. One may use a single-number criterion such as
IE and try to assess what operational guarantee may be derived from it. Note that a single-number guarantee
merely expresses a constraint on P . For security guarantee one must show none of the P not ruled out by the
constraint would allow undesirable information for Eve. In this connection, Eve’s maximum probability P1 in
identifying the whole K is especially crucial. Its average over the a priori distribution of K is simply related
by −log to the so called minimum entropy, Hmin. Note also that there is no useful sense to talk further about
the probability of a particular P . Eve chooses for whatever reason a specific unknown attack to the users with
a resulting P that is only constrained by the single-number criterion. It was shown [7-9] that under an IE
guarantee, P1 can be relatively very large with some possible P . From Lemma 2 in [9], for l < n it is possible
that
IE
n
≤ 2−l , P1 ∼ 2
−l (3)
Since l is typically very much smaller than n with or without privacy amplification, the P1 of (3) is very much
larger than that of a uniform K. Note that P1 typically increases, and surely cannot be decreased by any privacy
amplification code (PAC) which is a many-to-one deterministic transformation. It is clear the P1 is a main
determining factor on the security of K. PAC may increase overall security for the same or larger P1 because
the key after PAC is shorter than before and hence the new P1 is effectively less damaging or can even be close
to ideal. From (3) it follows that, IE
n
≤ 2−l strictly limits the amount of (near) uniform key bits that can be
obtained from K by further PAC, and strictly limits the security level of such K by itself. This P1 consideration
applies to the trace distance criterion similarly, as is the operational meaning problem.
It follows from (3) that a very poor insecure K can have IE → 0 for n→∞. Let
IE = 2
−(λn−logn) (4)
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for a constant λ. Then IE goes to zero exponentially in n but it is possible that P1 is given by 2
−λn compared to
2−n of a uniform key. It is clear that however long n is, if λ << 1 the key K is then always very poor compared
to U and it never improves relatively for any n. As a consequence, n is not a security parameter at all in QKD.
There is in fact no security parameter in any known QKD protocol. Thus there can be no unconditional security
proof for QKD in the original sense of the term [4].
In this connection, it may be observed that asymptotic results are not sufficient for quantifying the performance of
a realistic system in any event. Everything in the real world is finite with no parameter value approaching infinity.
It is the quantitative security behavior of real systems that one must be concerned with. In particular, the so-
called secrecy capacity has no real security significance for concrete cryptosystems for two major reasons beyond
finite versus asymptotic. The secrecy capacity is defined as the difference between the information capacities of
the users and Eve. Since Eve cannot do coding on the data her capacity overestimates her information gain in
general. Since the users don’t know what active attack Eve has launched, there is no guarantee they can achieve
their information capacity apart from the finite n issue due to the lack of attacker channel characterization.
Thus, the difference in capacities or mutual information between them has no definite meaning. Note also that
such capacity is derived from a constant channel among different uses, which simply does not obtain under active
attacks and especially under entanglement attack in QKD. As indicated above, mutual information is not the
proper framework for analyzing QKD security, M -ary detection is more appropriate.
It turns out the phenomenon of quantum information locking makes IE not a good security criterion [10,11].
In [12] it is claimed that the system is secure if IE is exponentially small. Such claim is vague as can be seen
from (4) above unless λ is specified. It is falsified from [11] generally, since it is not ruled out that knowing
logn data bits in a KPA on K would reveal the entire n-bit K. Thus, the trace distance criterion d is suggested
instead [10, 13-14] while d is first proposed in [12] for composition security. The latter is a vague concept because
no operational quantitative meaning is ever given for d, nor is any precise definition provided for “universal
composition”. These problems are automatically solved, however, under the prevalent incorrect interpretation
of d.
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4 THE TRACE DISTANCE CRITERION
The criterion d is the trace distance between the real and the ideal quantum states for the users [10-14] and can
be written as a K-average distance [15], with p0(k) being the prior probability of K, ρ
k
E Eve’s probe state for
each k, and ρE the k-average ρ
k
E ,
d =
1
2
∑
k
||p0(k)ρ
k
E −
1
N
ρE ||1 (5)
Generally 0 ≤ d ≤ 1, the smaller d is the more secure K is with d = 0 for the perfect case. Upon measurement
on Eve’s probe, trace distance becomes or bounds a classical statistical distance δ(P,Q) between two classical
distributions P and Q. The interpretation of an “ǫ-secure” key, namely K with d ≤ ǫ, amounts to saying perfect
security is obtained with a probability ≥ 1− ǫ or equivalently the “maximum failure probability” is ǫ. For some
specific quotes see note [25] in [6]. We will call such interpretation of a d ≤ ǫ key an “ǫ-uniform” key.
This error is maintained in the review [3] and has never been re-tracked in the literature, contributing to the
widespread misconception mentioned in the Introduction. It has enormous consequences on the quality of a QKD
generated K, which becomes far inferior to a uniform key. Before discussing such consequences we summarize
three possible reasons for holding such a wrong interpretation and why they cannot be valid. Indeed, it can be
said that for d > 0 the key K is not uniform with probability 1 in general rather than uniform with probability
≥ 1 − ǫ. Actually, the mere talk of such probability is already misleading because there is no general meaning
one can give to such probability.
The statistical distance δ(P,Q) defined by
δ(P,Q) ≡
1
2
∑
i
|Pi −Qi| (6)
is interpreted in [14, 15] as the probability that P and Q are the same except with a probability at most δ(P,Q).
This is obtained through a joint probability that gives P and Q as marginals from a mathematical lemma that
does not guarantee its existence. Such a joint probability does not make sense since there is no random source
giving rise to it, and it does not imply the interpretation even if it is in force. See [6, 9, 15] for further discussion
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of this first reason. The second possible reason is the “distinguishability” probability interpretation of d or δ,
which neglects that there is an additive factor of 1/2 for binary decision [16]. The third possible reason is the
following decomposition under δ(P,U) = δE ,
Pi = (1− λ)Ui + λP
′
i (7)
for another distribution P ′ on i ∈ 1−N
We would not go into why (7) does not fully imply the wrong interpretation when λ = δE . It can be readily
shown that (7) holds if and only if
1− λ
N
≤ Pi ≤ λ+
1− λ
N
(8)
which implies all Pi are essential uniform. In contrast, under d ≤ ǫ it is possible to have [9,15]
P1 =
1
N
+ ǫ (9)
Note that ǫ = 10−20 [20] is very small for a binary decision problem but very big for an N -ary decision problem
for N = 21,000 and much larger in QKD protocols. In addition, there is the problem of many repeated uses.
The failure and consequence of the wrong interpretation of d can be easily seen from the following result. Under
δ(P,Q) ≤ ǫ, it is well known [17] that for an unconditional event A,
|P (A)−Q(A)| ≤ ǫ (10)
For Q = U , it is the case [18] that a conditional event B given A may achieve the following bound for some P
under the given constraint,
|P (B|A) − U(B|A)| ≤
ǫ
U(A)
(11)
The rhs of (11) can be much larger than ǫ and in fact exceed 1, which means P (B|A) is not constrained and can
reach 1. Under the wrong interpretation, on the other hand, P (A|B) = U(A|B) = |A||B| with probability 1 − ǫ.
The enormous difference in KPA security implication is obvious.
Such possible drastic breach of security may be expected to average out over different possible conditioning.
Indeed it is shown in [15] that one recovers, for the K1 and K2 averaged P1(K
∗
2 |K1 with K = K1||K2 and K
∗
2
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any subset of K2 that, for δE ≤ ǫ,
P1(K
∗
2 |K1) ≤ 2
−|K∗
2
| + ǫ (12)
Note that not just the whole K, not subset K∗2 has a better protection that ǫ from (12). Contrast such K
average with the case ofU which holds for any k and k-subset. Due to such additional averaging, instead of
just averaging over PAC the Markov inequality needs to be applied twice to convert the average guarantee to
individual guarantee which greatly increases the d level for individual guarantee to d
1
3 [15].
Generally, the wrong interpretation of a d ≤ ǫ key as an ǫ-uniform key solves the following security problems
handily which now have to be dealt with anew. As we shall see, either the solution is not known or appears
extraordinarily difficult or the resulting situation is very unfavorable for such QKD key.
(i) A primary point is what numerical value of d is adequate for security. The value d = 10−20 suggested in
ref. [19] is good under the wrong interpretation if only a one-shot trial is involved, and thus a perfect key is
for all practical purposes guaranteed except for the PAC and K averaging involved. However, the resulting
level of effective d′ ∼ 10−7 for individual guarantee from Markov inequality is far from adequate. If we take
10−15 to be an effective one-shot impossibility, a d-level less than 10−40 is required. Even such relatively
very large d level (for n exceeding 1,000) cannot be remotely approached in a concrete QKD protocol. To
ensure a “near-uniform” key of d ∼ 2−n, it follows from (9) that one needs d ∼ 10−300 for n = 1, 000. The
most up-to-date single-photon BB84 protocol analysis (with many invalid steps) already gives zero net key
rate for K at d = 10−15 [20]. If a near-uniform key is desired, d = 10−20 would give no more than 22 bits in
principle, not enough to cover the message authentication key bits not yet accounted for. The situation is
dire for repeated uses of the QKD system. This issue of actual numerical values will be further elaborated
in section 8.
(ii) KPA security becomes now a serious issue due to (11), but is resolved in principle satisfactorily from our
(12) for the case of sequence (subset of K) estimation by Eve.
(iii) As mentioned in section 3, Eve’s BER needs to be bounded even when she fails to identify a subset of K
correctly. There is no such problem for a perfect key, of course. Apart from the whole K before it is used
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[15], there is no such bound known in more general situations including KPA.
(iv) Universal composition which follows immediately from the wrong interpretation of d [21] is lost. Each
application of K has to be examined by itself to see what operational guarantee would result, in particular
under possible quantum information locking leak.
(v) Security proofs involving the error correcting code and the subsequent privacy amplification code are
seriously affected when K is not perfect. We will discuss this separately in the following section 5. This
appears to be an issue for which no satisfactory solution can be found without the introduction of major
new cryptographic technique.
(vi) An imperfect key can have a very serious detrimental security effect on its use in an information theoretically
secure message authentication code (MAC) [18, 22-24], especially for the relatively large d-level that can be
obtained in concrete QKD protocols as discussed in (i) above. A typical MAC with ITS consists of a keyed
hash family with key Kh and often another key Kt for OTP the authentication tag. The security against
impersonation and substitution attacks is guaranteed through an ǫ-ASU hash family, in which ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 1,
upper bounds Eve’s success probability and ǫ itself is lower bounded by 1|t| . When Kh has a statistical
distance ǫh from uniform, or equivalently has a d-level ǫh in the quantum case, Eve’s success probability
may reach 1 for some tag sequences as in the privacy case (11) above [18]. Upon tag average similar to
(12), an ǫ-ASU family becomes an ǫ + ǫh-ASU family [25]. When Kt with d = ǫt is used, it becomes an
(ǫ+mǫt)-ASU family when the hash function is used m times [24]. Thus, a lower limit is now set by ǫh or
ǫt however long the authentication tag is! There is no longer a security parameter for MAC since the QKD
ǫ-key itself has none. Typical tag length of 64 bits already requires ǫh or ǫt be at the level of d ∼ 10
−20 for
individual guarantee, tens of orders of magnitude from that derived for just theoretical single-photon BB84
[20] and fifty orders of magnitude from the current experimental level. When the tag average us taken into
account it could reach one hundred orders of magnitude. Thus, a QKD key so generated does not and
cannot measure up to the key needed in most common MAC.
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5 ERROR CORRECTION AND PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION PROBLEMS
In this section we will show explicitly, for the first time since the ECC and PAC problems were originally indicated
in [7] ten years ago and elaborated somewhat in [25], that these problems appear quantitatively insurmountable.
The main culprit is the ECC problem, the PAC problem can by itself be handled as in [14] from a proper EC
treatment that appears impossible to carry out. The ad hoc and invalid ECC treatment in the literature thus
serves two purposes, to quantify the information leak (or key cost) from ECC and to allow the application of
PAC theory, without which there would be no quantification of the security and key rate of a QKD protocol.
In the QKD literature the Cascade reconciliation protocol was popular, but it has numerous invalid steps on
estimating the information leak to Eve which cannot be usefully bounded [26]. This information leak from error
correction is simply neglected in the earlier general security papers. More recently it is given by the ad hoc
formula, for 1 ≤ f ≤ 2,
leakEC = f · n · h(Q) (13)
Here Q is the quantum bit error rate the users measure and h is the binary entropy function. It is ad hoc
because the factor f is arbitrarily taken to represent the effect of a finite protocol with n ·h(Q) itself taken to be
the asymptotic leak. What is the derivation of (13) under a general attack, just asymptotically? There is none
offered in the literature, this crucial difficulty not mentioned at all! In [20] the whole book [17] is referred to for
n · h(Q) but [17] does not treat such problem. In particular, the memoryless channel treated in [17] simply does
not apply to joint attack. In [3] there is no formula given for leakEC and thus the results are true by definition,
except it is then not shown that the final key rate is positive.
The discussion in [25] would not be repeated here on exactly what leakEC may be under a general attack. Under
collective attack only, it may appear that (13) for f = 1 may be derived asymptotically by OTP the parity check
digits of a linear ECC with uniform key bits. When the key bits are not uniform to Eve as those from a QKD
key, there is no quantification at all on what the resulting leakEC is, as point (v) of the last section indicates.
However, even when uniform bits are available for padding the problem is far more complicated even just for
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collective attacks, for the following reason.
Let ρx be the density operator of Eve’s probe which depends on the data x chosen by Alice on the sifted key.
With a specific ECC, say the ith one among a given set I of possible ECC, the state becomes ρix, i ∈ I . Padding
the parity digits merely shows that only pi but not i is known to Eve. Thus Eve’s state ρx is transformed to ρ
′
x
ρ′x =
∑
i
piρ
i
x (14)
There may still be information leak from the change of ρx to ρ
′
x in addition to the padding bit cost, because ρ
i
x
with an ECC may leak a lot more information to Eve than ρx itself for at least some or possibly all i ∈ I . This
happens because the ECC allows Eve to correct her erros too. At any rate ρ′x needs to be dealt with for security
analysis after ECC, not ρx. It appears nothing general can be derived without attention to specific family I of
the chosen ECC for dealing with ρ′x.
This problem spills into the PAC one as follows. From [14, 27] one bounds the input state minimum entropy
(equivalently P1) or its ǫ-smooth generalization, and an output K can be guaranteed with a certain d level from
universal hashing. Padding the ECC parity digits, however, does not imply one can use the ρx bound for the
PAC input. One has to use that on ρ′x from (14). Incidentally, it is also clear that the ECC output state, which
is the PAC input state, has to be bounded appropriately no matter what leakEC, whether correct or not, is being
used. Since the incorrect input state ρx is used for the PAC input, the PAC guarantee itself becomes invalid.
There are only two approaches to finite protocols that offer a more or less complete treatment of a QKD protocol
apart from message authentication. We have discussed the Renner approach above. Hayashi completes and
generalizes the Shor-Preskill [28] approach to directly treat BB84 protocols, with different ways of accounting
for the ECC [29] and PAC leaks [30]. However, the ECC leak bound cannot be quantitatively carried out and
(13) is used instead [31]. It should be clear that (14) or its equivalent in any QKD approach would constitute a
major obstacle for quantifying security with ECC, and hence PAC also. They do not appear to be amenable to
quantitative treatment for the long ECC needed in QKD.
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6 PROBLEMS OF CONTINUOUS VARIABLE QKD
There have been much recent work on continuous variable QKD (CV-QKD) [3] due to its immunity to detector
blinding attacks [32] from homodyne detection. There is a special leakEC problem in CV-QD but already
the issue from (14) cannot be dealt with for whatever reconciliation procedure. There is a further robustness
problem that has never been addressed but which would render CV-QKD impractical, and it apparently cannot
be overcome, as follows.
Under an active heterodyne intercept-resend attack, the security analysis of CV-QKD with mutual information
or whatever criterion in the literature becomes invalid because Eve has fundamentally altered the channel. She
would get the data better than Alice or Bob in either the direct or the reverse reconciliation approach [33]. For
security she must be caught during the checking phase of the protocol. However, it is practically impossible to
run a protocol with such check for the following reason.
Let T be the system transmittance between Alice and Bob, and S the source photon number. Let a be the
source fluctuation or knowledge inaccuracy, b that of T , so that the total inaccuracy in the output signal level
is (a+ b− ab)ST . Thus, for 1% uncertainty in both S and T , the output uncertainty is ∼ 2%. Whenever ST is
significantly less than 12 , the users cannot tell Eve’s presence with her heterodyne-resend attack, thus establishing
a loss limit on security. Whenever (a + b − ab)ST is bigger than 14 , the users cannot distinguish Eve’s attack
from uncertainty in ST . This sets a strict upper limit on S.
In reality, the users do not know many system parameters to 1% even when they do not fluctuate or change
from bit to bit. Line loss is especially widely uncertain, even in a fiber. We cannot assume it is constant during
the execution of a QKD protocol. Such small uncertainty does not matter in ordinary optical communications
but matters a lot for QKD. During checking for Eve’s presence it may well happen that no threshold can be
found with both acceptable security and low enough false alarm rate (leading to protocol being aborted) that
renders the protocol not much more inefficient than its already very low efficiency compared to ordinary optical
communications. Similar false alarm issue is also present in BB84 though not as seriously. Note that key
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bits spent in false alarm rounds are cost of the QKD protocol. It seems that single-photon or low signal level
cryptography, QKD or whatever, is a bad engineering idea.
7 A LIST OF SOME OTHER QKD SECURITY PROOF PROBLEMS
In this section we list some further major security proof problems with brief comments. More detailed discussions
will be referenced or provided in the future.
(1) No proof other than occasional invalid brief remarks has ever been provided to show why channel loss has
no security effect other than throughput reduction, even after reduction of the state space to include at least
the vacuum state. See [34] for some specific discussion and more will be provided elsewhere.
(2) The use of decoy states for multi-photon sources has widely been assumed [3] to lead to general security for
a 0.5 average photon number Poisson source. Some problems on such claim are described in [35] and more
will be given in the future. Basically, lots of attacks from Eve have not been accounted for. Furthermore,
there is no known concrete protocol that gives the claimed key rate and accessible information level even if
that exists from [28, 36]. Privacy amplification with decoy states cannot be quantified for several reasons,
in contrast to the claim in [36], including one similar to (14) that arises from multi-photon leak specifically
and not just from ECC.
(3) The classical inference from checking qubits to the sifted key qubits underestimates the error significantly.
A similar error is made in [20] in the bounding of Hmin. See [5] for a brief discussion with further details to
be given elsewhere.
(4) The symmetrization argument for general attack bounding is not applicable to the concrete BB84 protocols.
Again see [5] and future treatment.
(5) Eve’s quantum probe needs to be considered for any application of K, it cannot be argued away from
“universal composition” without the incorrect d interpretation. The phenomenon of quantum information
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locking has to be covered. In particular, the situation has not been treated for the application of K to
conventional MAC with ITS. The treatments in [18, 21-24] are classical.
(6) Detector blinding attacks [32] show that there is no security proof without modeling the relevant detector
behavior explicitly, which has not been carried out. There is a more general problem of model completeness
and related issues [37] that is absent or much less serious in mathematical cryptography and when larger
signals are used in physical cryptography. These issues cannot be avoided in the “device independent” type
approaches. Indeed, such issues can be traced to the use of small single-photon signals which are in principle
sensitive to minute disturbance in order that the disturbance-information tradeoff principle can function.
(7) We include here the problems of actual experimental implementations with quoted theoretical claims about
security level and key rate that are not justified even according to the theory literature. Thus, the NEC
system security claim [38] does not account for ECC and PAC leaks, and the Toshiba UK system [39] cannot
derive from [28] and [36] their key rate and security level ( and their decoy state generalization) because such
results are, in addition to being invalid as discussed some above, are only claimed to have been established
for CSS codes as ECC and PAC that are not implemented in their system.
8 NUMERICAL VALUES AND INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEE
The claimed theoretical single-photon BB84 security level of up to d = 10−14 [20], or even the often claimed
practically achieved level of d = 10−9 [40] for higher key rates, may seem adequate under the wrong interpretation
of d that K is ǫ-uniform. Perhaps a probability of 10−14 is synonymous with practical impossibility, for a single
trial. If such probability level is sufficient, no one would need a 64 bits or much longer key. It is easily seen
that just mere repetitions would render such probability unacceptable for security. If 100 rounds per second
are carried out in a QKD system, one day of operation would yield ∼ 107 rounds. Thus, even under the wrong
ǫ-uniform interpretation the security level is not adequate for many applications.
The situation is worse because there are two separate averages over different random variables in the d of a
QKD guarantee d ≤ ǫ. One of them is from averaging over PAC that is present in the wrong interpretation.
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One is averaging over K that is not present in the wrong interpretation, because K is then perfect with a high
probability and one can just treat it as uniform for all its values k. Even in ordinary manufacturing, individual
guarantee is used for quality control. Thus, one needs to convert an average guarantee to an individual one for
a QKD key K via Markov inequality, that for a random variable Z one has
Pr[|Z| ≥ δ] ≤
E[|Z|]
δ
(15)
When (15) is applied to minimize the total “failure probability” [15,41], the effective d level becomes d
1
2 for the
wrong interpretation and d
1
3 (but not d
1
4 ) under (12). Just from the square root of the wrong interpretation,
the effective individual guarantee level as compared to the uniform is unacceptable at 10−14, not to say from
the actual cube root. In effect, there could be many more breaches under an average guarantee and to ensure
otherwise, the average level itself has to be further reduced. If one considers 10−9 as the current state of art
(though that is invalidly derived as we discussed in this paper) and 10−15 for individual guarantee as proper
goal, there is a 36 orders of magnitude gap toward the goal. New cryptographic technique or principle is clearly
called for to bridge such gap.
In sum, not only is there a fundamental tradeoff between security level and key rate in QKD protocols of finite
n, there is such a tradeoff asymptotically also and there is no security parameter which can be independently
varied to increase security without affecting key rate. The precise quantitatively behavior is very unfavorable as
illustrated above and in point (i) of section 4.
9 REMEDY VIA KCQ AND DBM
The different quantum cryptographic approach of KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) [7,9] was orig-
inally developed to alleviate the inefficiency, sensitivity (lack of robustness), and infrastructure incompatibility
(commercially) of BB84 type protocols to make quantum cryptography practical. The original version of Alpha-
Eta for direct encryption [42] has been extensively developed, in particular by the US company Nucrypt, which
can be called PSK-Y00 to distinguish it from other signal set choices based on the same principle such as ISK-
Y00 [43], CPPM or PPM-Y00 [9], and the QAM-Y00 being investigated in Japan. I would like to separate the
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term “QKD” for protocols that depend on the disturbance-information tradeoff principle for security, in contrast
with the term “KCQ” that utilizes quantum effects associated with the optimal quantum receiver principle for
quantum detection [44] which does not require checking disturbance. KCQ is nevertheless fully quantum with
no classical analog and is capable of delivering ITS as in QKD. It is fully compatible with ordinary optical
communications through fibers or other media.
However, great difficulties are encountered in providing general security proofs to KCQ protocols, although under
“collective attacks” all protocols, classical or quantum, can be readily proved secure apart from the ECC problem
for finite protocols. The DBM (decoy bits method, which has nothing to do with decoy states in QKD) approach
is introduced to make general rigorous proof possible. It is a widely applicable technique in both classical and
quantum cryptography, and will be presented in detail elsewhere. Here we indicate how BB84 could be modified
to become not just the qb-KCQ protocol in [9] but also by DBM that allows a different rigorous approach to
security without disturbance-information tradeoff: simply use a pseudo-random number generator with a shared
secret seed key to pick the qubits as sifted key. The channel characterization may be done separately or from
the unused qubits. A final message authentication check on the generated key should (always) be employed. Its
quantitative ITS will be given in future papers.
10 CONCLUSION
Cryptography is a tricky subject, physical and quantum cryptography more so from the added essential physical
features on top. The problems involved are far from merely mathematical or physical. It involves conceptual
issues on the relation between mathematics and the real world in ways not encountered in other fields and not
discussed in books and articles. The numerous erroneous claims in QKD arise from that in part, the prevalent
wrong interpretation of an ǫ-secure key as an ǫ-uniform key being a good example. Since cryptography is a
serious matter, we must scrutinize our security arguments and pay due attention to Eve’s viewpoint to ensure
our security claim is validly established. In this paper we have presented some apparently very serious difficulties
in providing valid quantitative security claims in QKD. The keys given in the analyzed theoretical protocols
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cannot be considered secure even if the derivation is valid, while many steps in the analysis are actually invalid.
Claims that the corresponding experimental systems are secure in principle are not founded. Hopefully the
reader would be motivated to look seriously into alternative approaches, not just for security but also for the
very relevant issues of efficiency, robustness, and whether quantum cryptography does provide a sensible real
world alternative in various applications.
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